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The Robert Schuman Centre was set up by the High Council of the EUI in 
1993 to carry out disciplinary and interdisciplinary research in the areas of 
European integration and public policy in Europe. Research publications 
take the form of Working Papers, Policy Papers and books. Most of the 
Working Papers and Policy Papers are also available on the website of the 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies: http://www.iue.it/RSC/ 
PublicationsRSC-Welcome.htm. In 1999, the Centre merged with the 
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The European Forum was set up by the High Council of the EUI in 1992 
with the mission of bringing together at the Institute for a given academic- 
year a group of experts, under the supervision of annual scientific 
director(s), for researching a specific topic primarily of a comparative and 
interdisciplinary nature.
This Working Paper has been written in the context of the 1999-2000 
European Forum programme on “Between Europe and the Nation State: the 
Reshaping of Interests, Identities and Political Representation” directed by 
Professors Stefano Bartolini (EUI. SPS Department). Thomas Risse (EUI, 
RSC/SPS Joint Chair) and Bo Strath (EUI. RSC/HEC Joint Chair).
The Forum reflects on the domestic impact of European integration, 
studying the extent to which Europeanisation shapes the adaptation patterns, 
power redistribution, and shifting loyalties at the national level. The 
categories of 'interest’ and ‘identity’ are at the core of the programme and a 
particular emphasis is given to the formation of new social identities, the 
























































































































































































After ten years of controversial negotiations, the European Union finally took 
action to liberalize the electricity supply industry in 1996. Given that the 
longstanding debate on the organization of electricity supply w as brought to an 
end through bilateral negotiations between France and Germany, the reform has 
been often presented as a straightforward French-German deal. This paper, 
however, argues that the French-German intergovernmental deal was only the 
tip of the iceberg. Perceptions of national interests evolved considerably in both 
countries. While France turned from initial support of the market opening to a 
much more defensive posture. Germany moved from skepticism to fervent 
support of liberalization. The most important cause for these changes was at the 
EU level, not at the national level. The EU institutional context and the 
dynamics of EU negotiations induced preference changes and several key 
domestic political realignments on the part of sectoral and state actors.
Both authors acknowledge financial support for their research from the German American 
Academic Council. Rainer Eising also acknowledges the support of the Fritz-Thyssen- 























































































































































































After ten years of debate, the EU took action to liberalize the electricity supply 
industry through a European directive that was passed in December 1996. The 
policy-making process that preceded this decision staged some of the most 
enduring and controversial negotiations that ever occurred amongst the 
members of the European Community in a single policy area. The discussions 
were brought to an end only by a direct bilateral settlement between France and 
German)' that took place at the highest level of government. While these two 
countries had jointly proclaimed their reluctance to the liberalization of 
electricity markets in the late 1980's, in the mid-1990's they consented to the 
agreement reached in the Council negotiations. The apparent preponderance of 
French-German intergovernmental bargains in the liberalization process poses a 
puzzle: why did France and Germany depart from the status quo ante?
The 1996 directive was often presented in the press as a straightforward 
Franco-German bargain -  Germany wanted liberalization. France did not. so 
they cut a deal that satisfied both parties. Implicit in this diagnostic is a 
representation of the EU as a negotiating arena where powerful state actors -  in 
this case, mainly France and Germany -  engage in negotiations and eventually 
reach agreements that conform with their respective basic economic interests.1 
This power- and interest-based interpretation tends to vindicate conventional 
understandings of international political dynamics." Even scholars who do not 
work in the IR tradition typically hold that the member states form their 
preferences on the basis of their national situations and will defend their 
national regulatory regimes at the EU level -  they rarely consider EU-level 
factors as important parameters in the evolution of preferences and positions 
about domestic policy regimes.3 If either of these two types of interpretation is 
correct, the formation and the evolution over time of French and German 
positions on electricity reforms should then be understandable in national terms, 
with relatively little attention devoted to the EU-level policy process per se. In 
particular, the breakdown of the French-German agreement of 1989 and the 
intergovernmental agreement of 1996 should result primarily from the 
underlying evolution of economic and group interests as they were aggregated 
within the French and German political arenas, or from a clear evolution in 
national regulatory regimes away from the 1989 status quo.
We consider, however, that an explanation of electricity liberalization in 
terms of national interests can be misleading. This is surprising since the 
electricity sector seems to be a perfect case for reasoning on the basis of 
national interests. The sectoral governance arrangements belong in the hallmark 



























































































was marked by a very long period of stability on the national level across all the 
member states. Since electricity supply was network-bound and regarded as a 
natural monopoly, competition was absent and there was a preference for 
national autonomy in the supply of energy sources to the sector. Furthermore, 
electricity is a relatively simple commodity and the level of uncertainty on 
electricity markets is relatively low -  the industry is not subject to erratic 
changes in demand or fast technological change: its investments are highly 
capitalistic and carefully planned on a medium- to long-term basis. To be sure, 
important supply shocks and technological innovations have occurred since the 
1980's. especially the considerable decrease in real-term oil prices and the 
advent of low-cost technology for gas-fired and combined cycle power 
generation. Yet these trends have been slowly progressing, and in terms of 
overall energy utility portfolios, their effects can only be felt over the long run.4 
The structural evolution of national interests -  based on market and technology 
factors -  does not satisfactorily "'explain” the changes in French and German 
preferences as expressed by the evolution of these countries' positions on the 
electricity directive proposals.
Thus, the paper will show that explanations centering on the pursuit of 
national interests rooted in domestic structures provide only a limited 
understanding of EC negotiations. The initial constellation of preferences 
within the member states was such that there was very little bargaining room for 
the emergence of a European directive. Insofar as national interests resulted 
from the structural and institutional characteristics of longstanding French and 
German domestic economic models, these interests were quite resilient and do 
not permit to account for the occurrence of change. If anything, domestic 
structures of interests were a factor of inertia in the evolution of electricity 
regulation and supply at the EU level. While domestic interest structures 
certainly contribute to explain the relatively slow pace of institutional change, 
they do not permit to account for the advent of institutional change itself. The 
government of France, for better or for worse, remained wedded to the energy 
infrastructure built by the state-owned utility EDF in the postwar period -  the 
supply of electricity by a state-owned monopolistic producer in accordance with 
national priorities such as the development of nuclear power. Likewise, the 
German government was bound to defend a certain institutional structure of 
energy supply that had profound historical roots -  sectoral arrangements were 
characterized by the presence of a small number of large firms, several regional 
utilities, multiple local producers, both public and private ownership, and 
continued reliance on traditional energy resources such as coal. Much more 
central to the change in French and German attitudes was the evolution of 
national perceptions of EU-level energy liberalization and of the political stance 




























































































Accordingly, our paper offers an explanation of electricity reform that 
centers on the logic of EU-level negotiations rather than on market or 
technological pressures. It argues that the institutional context of EU 
negotiations systematically induced preference changes on the part of state and 
market actors, which in turn fostered political realignments on both the 
European and the national level. The member states' involvement in EU 
negotiations opened the way for a reassessment of national electricity structures 
and for a redefinition of national preferences. Changes in domestic actors’ 
preferences and political strategies are more clearly readable in terms of 
evolving EU negotiations than if we only consider the slowly changing 
domestic economic and institutional structures that manifest French or German 
"national interests’’.' We suggest that negotiations within the Council of 
Ministers consistently led the member states to change their preferences and 
gave them important disincentives to pursue their “national interests” rigidly. 
The liberalization of EU electricity markets is thus best understood as a 
phenomenon of institutionally embedded change.0 In this case, institutional 
embeddedness is manifested in two ways. First, the institutional dynamic of EU 
negotiations, in which France and Germany were placed in the position of 
negotiating over an agenda that was set by the European Commission, heavily 
weighed on the general orientation and characteristics of the 1996 directive. 
Secondly, the continuing differences among national institutional structures of 
electricity supply shaped the relatively open-ended nature of the 1996 directive.
The rest of this paper develops in four steps. Section II briefly 
summarizes the main steps of the European electricity policy-making process 
over a decade. Sections III and IV successively examine the French and the 
German cases. In each case, the context of EU negotiations induced a series of 
preference changes and domestic political realignments of certain key sectoral 
and state actors. The existence and the dominant mood of EU negotiations 
prompted certain French and German political actors to coalesce in favor of 
liberalization. Some state actors and big consumers in Germany pioneered the 
drive toward liberalization and were supported, later in the process, by some big 
electricity consumers and marginal producers in France and even by some big 
German utilities. These coalitions acquired more weight thanks to EU-level 
leverage and were able to obtain a victory over entrenched interest groups. 
Section V returns to the problem of EU-level policy-making In the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, France and Germany expressed converging preferences for the 
status quo. when they opposed the liberalization of the electricity market. As it 
turned out. however, EU-level institutional developments did not leave France 
and Germany much choice but to agree to a European directive. Thus, the 




























































































explained in terms of national preference changes and political realignments in 
the context of EU-level negotiations.
II. The Emergence of an EU Framework for Electricity Markets
In substance, the 1996 European directive mandating "gradual liberalization" 
lays the basis for creating an Internal Energy Market (IEM) for electricity. 
Until that directive, only the legally designated utilities in the member-states 
had monopolistic rights to engage in the supply and commerce of electricity. 
Typically, third parties (i.e., non-chartered electricity producers, consumers or 
distributors) did not have free access to the market and were not allowed to 
contract with suppliers or customers of their choice. The directive changed the 
status quo not only by mandating a certain level of "third-party access” (TPA) 
to the electricity networks, but also by ending the monopoly rights for the 
construction of power lines and power stations.6 In the first phases of market 
opening, only certain “eligible” customers will be concerned, and the task of 
defining criteria of eligibility is left to the discretion of national legislatures.In 
order to diffuse and postpone possible disagreements in implementing the 
European legislation, the Council has set the relatively remote date of 2006 for 
a review of progress toward the objective of an Internal Energy Market.
A first difficulty resides in assessing the practical significance of the 
directive. Only the future evolution of energy markets will tell us whether the 
1996 electricity directive was actually a landmark blueprint of change or a case 
of "much ado about nothing”. Some skeptical observers note that the result of 
the 1996 compromise was to legitimate rather than remove the pre-existing 
obstacles to market competition in various countries. Optimists within the 
European Commission and elsewhere believe nonetheless that, once the 
directive is implemented at the national level, market forces will be unleashed 
and will push electricity supply industry in the direction of greater openness. 
Several member states have already indicated that they will move greatly 
beyond the minimum thresholds and open their markets fully.10 To be sure, the 
electricity directive contains a great degree of flexibility and has been described 
as “a la carte” when compared to other more sweeping examples of EU-level 
reforms. It delineates a careful and incremental schedule of market opening that 
is limited to particular segments of the market and subject to future review in 
2006. It is safe to say, however, that even despite its limitations, the directive 
mandating for the liberalization of EU electricity markets represents a 
surprising outcome and a fundamental sectoral reform that hardly anybody 




























































































In fact, the path to the final text of the directive in 1996 was neither 
straight nor unÇventful. The directive proposal was introduced by the European 
Commission in 1992. This Commission initiative was in and of itself a rather 
surprising development and the result of a rather convoluted process. While 
liberalization in the electricity sector was only part of a broad movement of 
market-building encapsulated in the “1992’' objective of a SEM. the electricity 
sector was deliberately not mentioned in the White Paper on the Single Market 
at the origin of the Single European Act (SEA). In the mid-1980's. the idea of a 
common energy market was not high on the agenda. On the contrary, there were 
bitter memories of failed attempts to build a common energy policy, since the 
early days of the European Community and through the oil shocks of the 
1970's.11 Under the goad of a 1986 Council resolution, however, a piecemeal 
approach to electricity liberalization began to emerge. In 1988. the European 
Commission introduced a "green” (working) paper about the Internal Energy 
Market, proposing price transparency and freer transit of electricity across 
borders.1" Two directives were to be adopted, in 1990 and 1991. to fulfill these 
significant, yet relatively modest goals.1' However vaguely defined at that stage, 
the Commission’s objective to liberalize the electricity sector triggered already 
important reactions by both sectoral and state actors: In 1989, the member 
states' utilities and associations set up a trade association in Brussels -  
Eurelectric -  with the mandate of defending their common interests. Also, the 
German and French governments passed a joint communiqué at their summit of 
November 1989 that included a protocol on energy policy, in which they tried to 
set strict boundaries for the liberalization dynamic -  they accepted the principle 
of “free transit” of electricity across Europe, but only if mediated and controlled 
by the utilities; and they declared their opposition to the new concept of "third 
party access” as exemplified by the British electricity deregulation program.
In the early 1990 s. it was far from clear, to many observers, that 
electricity liberalization would continue beyond the fairly limited steps which 
had already been agreed upon. Any attempt to further liberalize this sector was 
risky , if only because of the predictable political opposition to this process. 
After airing in 1991 a first concrete proposal for TPA and some internal 
hesitations about the best method to implement it. the Commission decided not 
to act under its discretionary competition law prerogatives (i.e., by way of an 
Article 90 directive). Instead, it submitted in 1992 a first directive proposal 
subject to the Council s and the European Parliament's approval (under the new 
co-decision procedure as defined by the Maastricht Treaty). Yet, in the face of 
huge opposition on the part of important players, the proposal seemed 
moribund. The Maastricht treaty, in the context of which energy policy seemed 
reaffirmed as a national prerogative, was interpreted by many as an important 




























































































As it turned out. however, the liberalization process in electricity did not 
stop there. The Council expressed its .intention to proceed with liberalization 
and the relevant actors continued to negotiate actively on this issue. The 
Commission's proposal was the object of heated negotiations and numerous 
important amendments by the Council of Ministers from 1993 to 1996. 
Germany incrementally adopted an official position that was much more 
favorable to liberalization. The French government mandated the Ministry ot 
Industry to set up an expert commission in order to draft a report with policy 
recommendations on the sectoral governance of electricity in France.14 
Following this report. France proposed its own brand of liberalization, the 
"single buyer” (SB) concept — while accepting the principle of market 
competition for electricity generation, the proposal reaffirmed the role of 
monopoly utilities as the sole operator of the technical networks for 
transportation and distribution of electricity. This new proposal did not satisfy 
the Commission, but the Council decided to fudge the issue and mandated that 
the SB proposal be drafted into the legislation in conjunction with TPA.
For a while, the anti-TPA stance was unexpectedly reinforced by two ECJ 
rulings that leaned in favor of the principle of public service, in the 1994 
Corbeau and Almelo cases. In March 1995, the Commission issued a Council- 
mandated report comparing the TPA and SB systems, concluding that the two 
systems could be adopted in conjunction only if they guaranteed "equivalent 
results” in terms of market opening. Thereafter, negotiations kept stalling on 
important questions of principle -- e.g.. whether competition between electricity 
suppliers was desirable for its own sake and thus whether it should be integrated 
(with binding force) into the directive. At the Kohl-Chirac summit of December 
1995. the French and German governments had agreed to maintain cohesion and 
not let each other be outvoted in the Council on the issue of electricity 
liberalization. Therefore the prospects of a denouement to the saga of electricity 
liberalization looked even bleaker, since the French and German governments 
held diametrically opposite positions on the most contentious aspects of the 
proposal. Until very late in the process, it was not clear that there would be any 
genuine liberalization of electricity supply — let alone one that was acceptable 
to all parties. Many had almost given up any hopes of ever reaching agreement 
on the Commission's proposal.
The situation dramatically changed in the first half of 1996, when France 
and Germany came up with a compromise proposal. Based on the extant version 
of the directive proposal, the governments of these two protagonist states in the 
debate on electricity liberalization had bilaterally negotiated a common solution 
to the remaining disagreements. The text of the directive was accepted and 




























































































Council resolution was then sent to the European Parliament and definitively 
passed almost without any further amendments in December 1996. The 
dominant sentiment at the time of the second reading at the European 
Parliament was that the carefully crafted compromise was the object of a fragile 
political balance that any further amendments would seriously thwart the 
chances of a directive ever seeing the light.
III. The evolution of the French position in the EL electricity debate
France's official stance on electricity liberalization evolved from a rather 
aggressive pro-reform stance to a marked reluctance toward the EU directive. 
This change of position is better explained by the evolution of the debate at the 
EU level -  as well as a better comprehension of this debate in France -  than by 
the evolution of France's underlying economic interests. The EU debate first 
prompted certain hesitations in the process of defining a French strategy toward 
liberalization, and later indirectly provoked key political realignments, both in 
the French position at the EU level and within France domestically.
Uncertainties and strategic hesitations in a dual institutional context
The French position on the Internal Energy Market was not immediately clear. 
In 1986-88. the prospect of an Internal Energy Market stood at the intersection 
of two major concerns. On the one hand, the French government was eager to 
play an important part in the “1992" process. French government officials, like 
their colleagues in all other European governments, were trying hard to come up 
with concrete proposals which were intended to show that they were "good 
Europeans" and that they participated actively in the collective effort to "build 
the Single Market". On the other hand, they were trying to identify areas where 
France had particular interests in the market-building process. At that time, 
electricity seemed a good candidate. The French nuclear program was planned 
in the 1970’s at a time of intense fears of further energy shortages.15 Yet, in the 
context of 1980's relative energy glut and improvements in energy efficiency, 
Electricité de France (EDF) -  France’s only electric utility, owned by the 
French state -  was now producing more electricity than the French market could 
absorb. Thus, EDF executives were actively concerned with the search for new 
export outlets for this surplus capacity. At the same time, EDF was widely 
suspected of having the ambition to erect itself into the dominant supplier of 
electricity in Europe.16 Not surprisingly perhaps. EDF was confronted with 
important barriers to trade when it came to selling is surplus capacity. Thus, in 
the late 1980s. Spain had blocked EDF’s attempts to supply electricity to a 




























































































In that context, the French government -  EDF's ever-attentive 
shareholder -  started to champion the cause of opening national electricity 
markets to competition in the Council of Ministers.1 It seems unlikely that the 
French negotiators at the time measured the consequences of that tactical move. 
They were under strong pressure from EDF executives who were focused on the 
relatively narrow problem of guaranteeing access to export markets. The 
traditional view' within EDF rested on the notion that its legally guaranteed 
monopoly on the production, transportation, and distribution of electricity 
corresponded to a "natural” way of organizing a rational and economically 
efficient capital allocation and electricity supply mechanism. It took a w hile for 
EDF executives to realize that, however "rational”, the very position of their 
company could be threatened by a political process that was taking place 
outside of the Parisian networks of political power and influence with which 
they were familiar.15 The possibility that the fate of French energy policy could 
depend on the evolution of EC competition policy and the "1992” process did 
not register at EDF until late in the 1980’s. Only around 1989 did EDF realize 
that a European directive also had the potential of jeopardizing the company's 
institutionally entrenched monopolistic status for the supply of electricity in 
France.11 By that time. EDF conducted a first series of economic studies to 
ascertain whether and how the firm could benefit from the creation of a regional 
energy market.20 The studies concluded that there were gains to be made from 
increased trade with other European utilities and from a more market-based 
choice of energy portfolio options. But EDF economists also cautioned against 
the possibility for an inefficient duplication of production facilities and a price 
war that would jeopardize the profitability of previous investments, especially 
in nuclear powerplants.21 From then on. EDF adopted the official line that the 
opening of electricity markets must occur in full cooperation and agreement 
with other European utilities. Within the European industry forum of 
Eurelectric. EDF began to promote the idea of increasing cooperation between 
utilities and accepting only a very controlled and progressive sectoral evolution.
There were several reasons for this change of mood within EDF.'2 An 
important rationale for this cooperative attitude was that EDF executives valued 
their cooperative relationship with other utilities, since EDF was developing a 
European fast-breeder reactor and the next generation of conventional nuclear 
reactors (European Pressurized Reactors) and was also involved in the 
reconstruction plans for the East German power network. EDF executives 
reasoned that the French cost advantage in electricity was only a short-term 
phenomenon, since they were engaged in a cooperation with German utilities 
for the development of state-of-the-art nuclear technology. Another factor was 
the realization that EC-level liberalization could yield unpredictable results. In 




























































































executives and French state officials in charge of energy policy. The long 
tradition of 4 jate primacy in the regulation of public service could be 
jeopardized by EC-level attempts to liberalize the sector. Worst of all. the 
acceptance of nuclear energy in France could become a problem if the 
impression developed in the public that EDF was producing nuclear electricity 
mainly for export purposes. The contracts were already worth 70 billion francs 
and there was a perception that EDF could not go much further than that in 
terms of exports.'’ The IEM. initially conceived as an expedient vehicle of 
French export interests, suddenly acquired a dynamic of its own -  and not one 
that was necessarily consistent with French interests.
The realization that EDF w as no longer on board dampened the French 
government’s enthusiasm for the IEM around 1989. From then on. the French 
government adopted a defensive position on electricity liberalization.'4 In 
contrast to their initial stance on electricity liberalization, both EDF and the 
French Ministry of Industry now prioritized political and institutional 
considerations over short-term economic calculus. Meanwhile, however. 
Commission officials around the energy commissioner were busy drafting a far- 
reaching directive proposal for the liberalization of electricity supply. Despite 
the growing reluctance of the main concerned actor EDF. the French 
government could not easily renege on its earlier commitment to open European 
electricity markets. There were also some concerns, within the French 
government and EDF. that in the absence of a directive that specifically 
addressed the organization of electricity supply at the European level, the 
European Court of Justice would rule against the continuation of EDF's 
monopoly for imports and exports of electricity.2'1 Finally, there was also the 
possibility that the Commission might be able to act to liberalize electricity 
supply under its competition law prerogatives (article 90.3 of the Rome 
Treaty).'6 This evolution would have the effect of jeopardizing the position and 
role of EDF at the apex of French electricity supply.
For a variety of historical and political reasons, the very idea of a change 
in the monopolistic position and legal status of EDF in France was particularly 
sensitive. Since its creation as a state-owned public utility in 1946. EDF had 
become a political symbol. Among the French public, there is still a vivid 
memory of EDF’s important role in the major economic choices of the postwar 
period, especially the task of collective economic reconstruction in the 
immediate postwar period and the development of nuclear power.27 The 
successive French governments who dealt with the EU reform proposal were 
eager to avoid any change in the 1946 statute of EDF. which were considered 
by many as untouchable, especially within the CGT (a national labor union with 



























































































They were also very worried about potential claims that the government was 
sacrificing the French model of public service on the European altar. Some 
experts on French political economy have cogently argued that the factual basis 
for such claims is at least debatable.2' It remains nonetheless that, given the 
salience of the "public service” tradition in the realm of France's political 
symbols, no French government could afford to completely ignore such 
criticisms.
Last but not least, state officials were concerned about the effects of 
opening electricity supply to market competition on the financial well being of 
EDF. w hich remained a cherished possession of the French state. The French 
state was eager to protect its recent and not yet amortized investment in the 
nuclear electricity program. Since the 1970's, the state had extended huge 
resources in the form of preferential loans for the completion of that program: 
state officials now' expected that investment to pay off.:) By the late 198()’s. 
EDF had become a cash cow and any change in the situation was considered 
dangerous. Record EDF profits were good for the French state because they 
translated into an influx of money for the ow'ner-shareholder.30 The balance of 
political power between EDF and the Finance Ministry was such that EDF 
would generally comply to the state’s cash requests, however reluctantly.’1 
Preserving this source of income as an instrument to preserve a balanced budget 
was especially important for the French government in the run-up to Economic 
and Monetary Union. Faced with the prospect of definite short-term costs, the 
hypothetical long-term welfare benefits of electricity liberalization did not 
appear as sufficiently tangible for any of the successive French ministers to 
seriously envision a rapid de-monopolization of French electricity supply.
Domestic political realignment
By 1995-96. however, everybody familiar with the EC debate in France began 
to acknowledge that the situation at the EU level had evolved and that some 
things would need to change in the governance of the French electricity sector. 
The French state was under growing pressure to change its intransigent position 
and to compromise. In Brussels, the Commission under the new energy 
commissioner Christos Papoutsis was becoming more accommodating, while 
the Council was maintaining its principled demand for a reform of electricity 
markets. This development made it more difficult for the French to pursue a 
strategy of systematic opposition to an increasingly pragmatic reform proposal 
that could no longer be rejected as “ideologically liberal”. In a sense, the Single 
Buyer proposal was a tactical move in a strategy designed to maintain a 
maximum degree of freedom -  but without excessive illusions on the French 




























































































systems came out in April 1996. those French officials who were close to the 
negotiation realized that the French position must evolve in order to avoid 
complete isolation within the Council of Ministers. '
Meanwhile, the proponents of electricity liberalization in Paris were 
slowly gaining ground. Many thought that EDF officials, who unrelentlessly 
pointed to their technical and economic prowess and especially their record of 
cheap nuclear electricity, were too "arrogant". Upon the failure of the SB 
proposal, there were some tensions between French government officials and 
EDF executives, who blamed each other for the blunder." Past the initial 
rejection against Brussels' interference in the French tradition of public service, 
elite perceptions of EU-level liberalization started to evolve considerably.'4 In 
some government circles, especially in the competition directorate of the 
Ministry of Finance, the end of EDF's monopoly position was even seen as a 
rather desirable thing. This was even more the case among the potential 
competitors of EDF. including the two big water utilities. Compagnie Générale 
des Eaux and Compagnie Lyonnaise des Eaux, as well as some city councils 
W'ho resented EDF's production and distribution monopoly. Finally, big 
industrial electricity consumers were showing increasing signs of impatience 
with EDF's monopoly. To be sure, industrial consumers were for the most part 
satisfied with the electricity prices and level of service offered by EDF. Besides, 
the consumers’ political clout was relatively limited in comparison to that of 
EDF. especially in the absence of a serious price problem such as in Germany.30 
Yet the French association of industrial electricity consumers. UNIDEN. was 
actively involved in trying to obtain that EDF's monopoly be at least modified 
so as to allow for more competition in energy services and give the consumers 
more "maneuvering space” in negotiating with their supplier." Thus, the 
government's defense of French-style public service increasingly appeared like 
a rear-guard battle, not only vis-a-vis its negotiating partners but also 
domestically.
In a nutshell, the context of EU negotiations revealed that the French 
model of electricity supply, with EDF at its apex, was no longer the object of an 
unquestioned consensus in France. Given French ambiguities vis-a-vis the 
Commission's directive proposal, the French government’s position on this 
topic was becoming increasingly uncomfortable. At that point, a few key 
officials at the highest level of the French government decided to break the 
deadlock for the sake of quickly reaching a compromise. They picked up the 
latest version of the Commission's directive proposal, entered into bilateral 
talks with their German counterparts, and finally agreed to a solution to the 
remaining points of contention. This paved the way for the Council’s June 1996 




























































































end of the process, however. The translation of the European directive into 
French law was then considerably delayed and has only occurred in January 
1999. The debate on the new French electricity law at the National Assembly 
has been very controversial and the government was forced to accept a number 
of amendments to its bill.'5 Despite a vocal opposition to the European 
directive, however, the bill passed the obstacle of the first parliamentary reading 
and is on course for being enacted into French law before it comes into force in 
accordance with the directive.
From a French perspective, what was at stake was the state's capacity to 
maintain a minimum say over the determination of the national energy portfolio, 
as well as the model of ‘ public service" as embodied by EDF. The foremost 
objective of the successive French governments who were engaged in the EU 
negotiation on electricity liberalization was to preserve the integrity of that 
French model, in part for fear of strikes and other forms of protest/0 Poll 
numbers clearly suggested that the French remained strongly attached to the 
defense of “French-style public service" and this could play out in favor of 
EDF’s monopoly. The wave of strikes in December 1995 only reinforced the 
government’s perception of public service liberalization as a danger. The 
French government, however, never completely ruled out the prospect of 
electricity liberalization.40 There was a feeling that France could live with a 
liberalizing directive, as long as certain key objectives were ensured -  the 
continuation and integrity of EDF as a "public service corporation", in close 
conformity to its 1946 statute; the preservation of state prerogatives in 
determining the broad outlines of energy policy: and. the preservation of 
nuclear power as a live energy option.
In the end. the evolution of the French position was due not so much to 
the economic interests of its industry or its consumers, but to the dual 
institutional dynamics of EU-level negotiations and French public sector 
governance41 This dual institutional embeddedness provided the context for 
political realignments that oriented the outcome in the direction of change. 
Once certain actors who positioned themselves in favor of liberalization 
understood that the institutional dynamic of EU negotiations could become a 
way to offset the institutional constraints of the French electricity supply model, 
they began to really call for reform in unprecedented ways. In this sense, the EU 
process allowed industrial consumers and potential EDF competitors to voice 
their concerns louder than ever before. While there was little objective change 
in the formal institutionalization and representation of France’s “national 
interests” at the EU level, there was certainly a change in the way that these 
interests were expressed in domestic public discourse. In the end, the fact that 




























































































only a continued French commitment to the EU's institutionalized bargaining 
framework, but also a changing domestic political balance between the 
advocates and the opponents of electricity liberalization.
IV. The Evolution of the German Position in the EU Electricity Debate
In contrast to France's initial push for the opening of European electricity 
markets. Germany was initially very skeptical about the Commission's 
liberalization plans. But during the course of the EU level negotiations, the 
German government came to endorse the Internal Energy Market agenda 
wholeheartedly. This change of preferences was mainly due to the Federal 
Economics Ministry’s involvement in Council negotiations and caused major 
turnarounds in domestic interest coalitions.
Uncertainties and status quo orientations in the dual institutional context
In contrast to the nationalized structure of electricity supply in France, the 
organization of the industry in Germany evolved on a decentralized basis. The 
sectoral structure consists of a plethora of public, private and mixed ownership 
firms whose activities are coordinated by contracts and associations. There are 
three groups of utilities: some seven hundred municipal utilities, about sixty 
regional utilities, and nine interconnected utilities who dominate electricity 
generation and transmission.42 Among the latter, the three largest utilities stand 
out: RWE Energie AG, PreussenElektra AG, Bayemwerk AG. Due to the close 
relations between municipalities and national political actors and to the large 
utilities' economic weight, the electricity sector’s firms and associations carry 
great political weight. In the state apparatus, the German state (Lander) 
governments’ economics ministries and the Federal Cartel Office 
(Bundeskartellamt) have competencies in the economic regulation of the sector 
while the Federal Economics Ministry (Bundesministerium fur Wirtschaft: 
BMWi) is mainly responsible for energy policy formulation.
Until the EU initiative, the attitude of the state and sectoral actors alike 
was shaped by their embeddedness in sectoral institutions. The structure and the 
regulation of the sector had been informed by two leading goals: the security of 
supply and the economic provision of services.42 Due to the natural monopoly 
characteristics of the sector, its exemption from competition was supposed to 
serve these goals. Two developments in the early 1990s are indicative of the 
preponderance of status quo orientations among state actors. First, the 
established structure of the sector was by and large transferred to the new 




























































































Economics Ministry wanted, mostly for symbolic reasons, to upgrade 
environmental protection into a leading goal of German energy law. However, 
this reform was neither intended to change regulatory standards of 
environmental protection, nor to introduce more competition in the electricitv 
sector. As late as 1991. Economics Ministry officials considered that there was 
no need to dramatically change German competition rules in the electricity 
sector.44 State actors were satisfied with a process of incremental reform of 
established sectoral structures: they did not have any plan to overhaul the w hole 
electricity supply industry.
Thus. German political actors w'ere generally very hesitant with regard to 
European proposals for an Internal Energy Market. The coalition government 
made up of the Christian Democratic Party/Christian Social Union and the Free 
Democratic Party, the opposition parties (Social Democratic Party. Biindnis 
90/DIE GRUNEN), and the different Ministries at the federal and regional level 
ail took a rather negative stance.4> They welcomed the Commission's decision 
to opt for the co-decision procedure and to refrain from using EC competition 
law- in order to liberalize the energy sectors. But with regard to the core 
elements of the Commission directive proposal, they emphasized the 
heterogeneity of the member states' sectoral structures and the need to maintain 
the longstanding principles of network-bound energies. In line with the position 
of German sectoral actors, they stressed the need for a reciprocal opening of 
markets in all the member states 46
Preference changes and multi-level games
Nevertheless, the Federal Economics Ministry gradually came to change its 
view on the electricity sector and increasingly regarded the EU reform as an 
opportunity to reform the German sector. The attitude of ministry officials, 
previously characterized by a close interaction with sectoral actors, shifted 
towards a more positive evaluation of competition in the energy sector. Their 
close interactions w ith other national officials and the decision-making process 
of the Council of Ministers triggered a reconsideration of the national 
settings.47 Within the Ministry, an overall consensus for the introduction of 
competition gradually emerged. While ministry officials perceived that EU 
negotiations might strengthen their political position at the domestic level, their 
change of preferences cannot be interpreted merely as a bureaucratic-political 
move. Rather, it also reflected a fundamental re-assessment of the principles 




























































































Three ideational factors facilitated the Economics Ministry's acceptance 
of EU liberalization. First, the UK had already privatized its sector in 1990. The 
British reform was closely monitored by BMWi officials and had an important 
demonstration effect. It showed that competition could be introduced in the 
electricity sector without compromising the security of supply. As a 
consequence, it undermined the conventional wisdom that competition could 
not really work in the sector due to its economic and technical features. Second, 
the German deregulation commission (a body of economic expertise) presented 
a report on network-bound energy resources in March 1991.48 That report 
advocated a liberalization of these sectors. Four of its proposals were then 
accepted by the Federal Government and officially introduced into the EC 
debate. Formally, the German position was based on the deregulation 
commission’s proposals, but this input mainly gave additional support to the 
arguments that had been debated on the EU level and that had caused the initial 
turnaround of the Ministry. It provided additional independent justifications for 
the sectoral reform, as did further reports arguing in a similar line.49 Third, 
electricity liberalization was linked to the broader debate about the 
competitiveness of German industry and of the “production site Germany" 
(“Standort Deutschland") launched in the late 1980s by the national producers' 
association (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie. BDI).50 This debate 
gained strong momentum in the 1990s due to the depression in the new German 
Lander and also to the perception of growing global economic pressures. The 
acceptance of liberalization proposals was made much easier by this political 
and economic climate.
The revised position of the BMWi was increasingly supported by other 
important state and market actors. The Federal Cartel Office developed an 
active liberalization policy. In line with the Federal Economics Ministry and on 
the basis of German and EC competition law. the Office brought test cases on 
the sectoral monopoly rights and on third party access, which were important at 
the time even though the German courts later them turned down (Markert 
1996). Important interest groups also supported the move towards liberalization 
and pressed for change. To be sure, the industrial energy producers and 
consumers and their trade association VIK (Verband Industrielle Energie- und 
Kraftwirtschaft), the BDI and also smaller economic consumers in the German 
Federation of the Chambers of Commerce (Deutscher Industrie- und 
Handelstag. DIHT) had already demanded cuts in electricity rates to lower 
production costs since the early 1980s. But only when the EU liberalization 
picked up political momentum in the early 1990’s did the Federal Economics 
Ministry become an active reform proponent. In 1994, the Ministry even put 
forward its own draft proposal to liberalize the German sector.51 The intent of 




























































































discussion at the same time. The content of the proposal was heavily influenced 
by the involvement of ministry officials in the EC debate and bv the proposals 
of the deregulation commission.02
This turnaround in the strategy of the Federal Economics Ministry 
provoked major realignments in the domestic interest coalitions and impinged 
heavily upon traditional cleavage lines within the sector. Early in the debate, the 
Association of German Electricity Utilities (Vereinigung Deutscher 
Elektrizitatsvverke: VDEW) had managed to develop a unifying concept for all 
of its members, namely, the reciprocity of market opening in the European 
Union. According to the association, the Commission's proposal had a 
discriminatory effect on the decentralized regimes such as German) vis-a-vis 
state monopolies such as EDF.53 Despite the fact that the internal agreement on 
the anti-liberalization stance of the association was less than perfect, state actors 
and political parties accepted the quest for reciprocity as an important fairness 
criterion.54 As a consequence, the reciprocity argument linked the success of the 
national reform to the outcome of EC negotiations. Without an agreement at the 
EC level, a process of national reform would not have been pursued because it 
would have meant a unilateral opening of the German market.
But gradually, the combined pressure for reform at two political levels led 
to the erosion of consensus among sectoral actors. While the local utilities and 
their Association of municipal utilities (Verband kommunaler Unternehmen: 
VKU) ferociously opposed any kind of liberalization, the regional and the large 
utilities opted for the introduction of competition as a lesser evil. These two 
groups of utilities feared that the municipalities would be granted major 
exemptions from the liberalization due to their linkages with the political 
actors.'' They also came to regard the EU liberalization as an opportunity to 
undermine the municipalities’ control over local supply areas. Such an opening 
of municipal areas of supply was unlikely to come about in a national reform. 
Consequently, both the regional and the interconnected utilities and their 
associations demanded that municipalities be included in the liberalization 
process.56 As a consequence of this move, the credibility of arguments denying 
the potential of competition in the electricity sector was even more impaired. 
The new opportunities offered by EU reform and the strong support of the 
municipalities within the Federal Government and the Federal Council paved 
the way for a coalition between the interconnected and the regional utilities on 
the one hand and the Federal Economics Ministry and the major producers' 





























































































Yet. in contrast to France where state power is highly concentrated, the 
interlocked and decentralized character of the German political-institutional 
structure, with its multiple decision-making and veto points, set the stage for 
controversial negotiations within the state apparatus, among the political 
parties, and between state and sectoral actors.5 At first, the Federal 
Government did not even manage to agree internally upon the reform because 
the municipal firms voiced public-interest arguments against it.58 Due to the 
local power of the municipalities and to their relays within the major political 
parties, municipal objections to electricity reform found some echoes at the 
national level within the parties, the Federal Council (Bundesrat). and several 
federal ministries. The Federal Ministry of Finance (Bundesministerium fur 
Finanzen, BMF) and the Federal Ministry of the Interior (Bundesministerium 
des Inneren. BMI) were concerned about the financial consequences of the 
reform. The Federal Ministry of Urban Planning and Construction 
(Bundesministerium fur Raumordnung. Bauwesen und Stadtebau. BMBau) 
feared the introduction of inter-regional price differences. The Federal Ministry 
for the Environment (Bundesministerium fur Umwelt. Naturschutz und 
Reaktorsicherheit. BMU) even capitalized on the EC debate by putting forward 
its own model of "ecological liberalization".59 Faced with the resistance of 
other ministries, the Federal Economics Ministry was no longer able to 
independently pursue its national reform plans and thus relinquished them to the 
1994 governmental agenda. Its efforts to submit a compromise proposal at EU 
level during the German Council presidency in 1994 were also thwarted by the 
other ministries.60
It took the Federal Chancellor's backing of the compromise achieved at 
the EU level to broker an agreement within the Federal Government. After a 
series of negotiations wdth the other ministries and the sectoral interest groups, 
the BMWi presented a modified reform proposal in 1996 that proved to be 
acceptable to the other departments. Then, the EC directive effectively 
transformed the national debate into an implementation process. But as it 
included multiple alternatives and formed a framework rather than a detailed 
prescription, the "semi-sovereignty” of the German political system also shaped 
the implementation of the EU directive. Since the reform bill affected certain 
adminstrative prerogatives of the Lander, it still required at that stage the 
consent of the Federal Council which therefore effectively held a veto position. 
In contrast to the coalition government, the Social Democratic Party and the 
Green Party -  who held a majority in the Federal Council -  remained strongly 
supportive of decentralized energy supply and of environmentally friendly ways 
of generation as proposed by the municipalities. Therefore, the Federal Council 
demanded major changes in the government's proposal. In order to avoid 




























































































Government further modified its proposal. In particular, it dropped certain 
provisions that mandated a detailed legal regulation of network access, and 
opted for self-regulation by market actors. From the government's perspective, 
a process of self-regulation by the sectoral association in conjunction with 
industrial generators and consumers presented the advantage of releasing some 
of the external political pressures. According to the Federal Government, the 
proposal then no longer required the consent of the Federal Council: 
unsurprisingly, however the latter vehemently opposed this interpretation. The 
recourse to self-regulation strengthened the position of the Federal Government 
vis-à-vis the Federal Council and the opposition parties.61 The reform was made 
institutionally possible by the pressures arising from EU-level negotiations -  to 
which the Federal Economics Ministry could refer throughout the debate -  and 
the political exclusion of the Federal Council. Both of them reduced the 
relevance of traditional veto points in the German state system.6'  Nevertheless, 
even the parliamentary parties of the coalition government added important 
changes to the proposal reflecting the negotiation pressures within coalition 
governments. It was mainly the CDU/CSU fraction in the Parliament 
(Bundestag), which to some degree changed the focus of the proposal away 
from “industrial competitiveness’’ to include several public interest provisions.6_’
In sum. the German reform abolishes the long standing monopolies of the 
utilities and goes far beyond the minimum provisions of the EC directive. First, 
it does not restrict the range of eligible consumers. However, since the 
municipalities still maintain a large degree of control over their local supply 
areas and since there are no provisions that ensure market access for domestic 
customers, competition will be limited to industrial consumers and to 
distributors, at least for an interim period. Second, the reform covers both the 
electricity and the gas sector. However, it did not formulate explicit rules for 
network access in the gas sector which were left open until the content of an EC 
directive on the gas sector would be known. Thus, the embeddedness of German 
reforms in an EC context gradually changed the traditional views and 
orientations of German state actors. EC negotiations triggered learning 
processes within the Federal Economic Ministry. The institutional 
transformation of the BMWi and its central position in the EC and national 
debates also increased its autonomy vis-à-vis other ministerial departments and 
sectoral interest groups. To be sure, it took a lot of domestic compromising and 
politicking in order to pass the recent electricity reform in Germany. Without 
EC-level liberalization, however, it is highly unlikely that such a major reform 




























































































V. The Effect of the European Union on the Definition of National Interests
Our discussion of the French and German debates on the reform of electricity 
supply illustrates the fact that the member states do not necessarily hold on to 
fixed negotiating positions. This is not a trivial observation since many 
accounts of EU decision-making processes gloss over the fact that interstate 
negotiations are institutionally embedded in an EU framework. In such context, 
member states can be led to significantly change the ways in which they define 
their interests, primarily for two reasons. First, the incremental decision-making 
procedures w ithin the Council generate certain negotiation dynamics that have 
substantive effects on the nature of EU policies. Secondly, these negotiations 
are situated in the context of a broad informal framework of institutionalized 
principles that contribute to the convergence of expectations and to the 
formulation of solutions that can be regarded as fair by all the member states.
Incremental negotiation dynamics in the Council
In the multilateral setting of Council negotiations, problems are debated in a 
w ay that requires some degree of abstraction from the concrete national settings. 
Due to time constraints, the Council working groups. COREPER. and the 
Council of Ministers itself cannot discuss more than three to four aspects of the 
Commission directive proposals during a tour de table. Therefore, the 
multiplicity of national positions is synthesized into small bundles of 
controversial issues, where the common text is written in “brackets" that 
become relatively decoupled from the underlying national structures and 
interests. The name of the game is to erase as many brackets as possible in the 
course of the negotiation.
As a consequence of this method, the bargaining style in the Council is 
more often analytical than adversarial, which to a certain degree de-legitimizes 
the defense of concrete national situations. Those member states willing to 
defend their national settings are forced to come up with proposals that not only 
reflect their own domestic structure, but can also be applicable in and 
acceptable to the other member states. Thus, the embeddedness within Council 
debates limits the range of legitimate arguments available to the member states. 
The Council presidency and the Commission are responsible for the isolation of 
problems and the generation of compromise proposals. In this line, even France 
and Germany had to put up compromise proposals. This dynamic is perhaps 
best illustrated by the debate on the French Single Buyer proposal. In order to 
defend the mam institutional features of its nationalized electricity supply 
structure and win the support of member states with similar structures, the 




























































































as an alternative model to the Commission's proposal. Then, based on a study 
commissioned to an independent energy policy think tank, the Commission was 
able to demand important changes in the French Single Buyer proposal."4 The 
proposal's general elements were subsequently analyzed and accepted in 
principle by the Council, but in a substantially modified form.
Another consequence of isolating problem bundles is the Council's 
sequential approach to dealing with disagreements. Areas in which 
compromises seem forestalled are labeled as "political" and singled out tor 
postponed resolution at higher political levels. The least contested ("technical”) 
issues are negotiated in an iterative process and settled by the six-monthly 
Council conclusions. The resulting solutions then become part of the "acquis ot 
the dossier" and are no longer open for renegotiations. Backtracking behind 
interim agreements is generally not possible and the negotiations stay focused 
on open problems. The Council conclusions generate their own momentum 
because they include several specific solutions and point out remaining problem 
areas. For example, during the negotiations of the liberalization directive, the 
incremental negotiation techniques led to the deletion of the 185 national 
brackets. In the final phases of the negotiations, the Spanish and the Italian 
Council presidency made compromise proposals that greatly aided the deletion 
of the last brackets and the final acceptance of the directive.
Successive negotiation rounds generally lead the main actors to gradually 
re-evaluate both the Commission's proposals and the various national 
regulatory regimes. The continuous debate about the pros and cons of every 
single detail of each member state's regime induce a information-sharing and 
learning processes. This can. but does not necessarily lead to a greater 
acceptance of the EU framework. In the case of France, the Ministry of Industry 
turned from an initial short-term economic rationality that emphasized the gains 
from electricity exports to a more fundamental set of institutional 
considerations. It emphasized the principles of the French nationalized system 
of electricity supply in the EU negotiations but was also prepared to provide for 
a limited opening of the French electricity market as its Single Buyer proposal 
indicates. By contrast, the German Federal Economics Ministry accomplished a 
full-swing turnaround in favor of the Commission’s initiative. In the opinion of 
BMWi officials, the debate within the Council provided clear-cut evidence that 
the reasons for maintaining closed supply areas in the electricity sector were no 
longer acceptable. Thus, in the end, both countries came to prefer a solution that 
was roughly compatible with their domestic institutional characteristics. France 
allowed for a relative opening of its electricity supply but reasserted the primacy 



























































































of the electricity sector into line with the liberal tenets of the social market 
economy philosophy.
Institutional environment and fairness criteria in EU negotiations
European negotiations also occur in a collective normative environment that 
operates largely outside the formal decision-making framework of the treaties. 
These principles inform actors' behavior and facilitate the convergence of their 
expectations.b> Some of these principles derive from the historical and political 
context of the European agenda, others from certain general, institutionalized 
understandings of what European integration is about.
Thus, the liberalization of the electricity sector was considered as 
important when it became part and parcel of the Internal Market agenda. That 
agenda was not only rooted in the treaties, but also enjoyed a high degree of 
legitimacy in the decade following its adoption in the mid-1980’s. Another 
historically significant factor consists of the development of the French-German 
tandem within the European Union. The agreement between France and 
Germany “not to isolate one another in the Council" indicates that even 
powerful member states with opposite positions may forego issue-specific 
opportunities in the search for a common solution. Both member states refrained 
from seeking to mobilize a blocking minority against the directive within the 
Council. As a result, they were willing to accept a compromise that did not 
really satisfy them completely. For France, the EU liberalization went beyond 
what the French Industry Ministry was really willing to concede. In Germany, it 
was felt that despite the modifications to the Single Buyer proposal, the 
directive would not really provide for an equivalent opening of the market in all 
of the member states. Both France and Germany subordinated their specific 
sectoral interests to the broader political logic of their roles and relationships 
within the European Union.
A second, less historically contingent characteristic of the EU 
institutional environment concerns the preferred mode of interaction between 
the Council representatives of the member states. The Council members’ 
preference for collegial decision-making guarantees each member state a certain 
level of protection against the prospect of being outvoted in areas of qualified- 
majority voting. It also ensures the search for regulatory solutions that can be 
regarded as adequate and fair by all member states. The collective definition of 
“fair” criteria has important implications for the acceptance of EU legislation. 
For example, the member states came to focus on the degree of the national 
market opening as the prime criterion to provide for an equitable liberalization 




























































































focused the member states' attention on specific dimensions of the Commission 
proposal and made the debate appear as more technical. The Council formulated 
specific criteria to guarantee the equivalence of market opening in each member 
state, eventually leading to the complicated national quotas. The agreement that 
was finally reached by France and Germany at the level of heads of government, 
was predominantly based on the directive proposal as it had been negotiated 
within the Council. Here again, the institutional embeddedness of the 
negotiation in an EU framework impelled both member states to tone down 
their preponderant sectoral economic interests.
Our study of the liberalization of the EU electricity sector provides 
evidence that the EU member states do not conduct EU negotiations in a pure 
give-and-take spirit. In the case at stake, both France and Germany altered their 
positions, strategies, and to some extent their domestic preferences about the 
organization and regulation of their electricity supply industries. In both 
countries, the supply of electricity by public utilities had been marked by 
incremental change within stable economic structures and remained subject to 
relatively weak pressures arising from technological and market forces. One 
would expect these characteristic to render national interests particularly rigid. 
Nevertheless, the institutional embeddedness of EU negotiations led both 
France and Germany, over time, to change their preferences about their own 
national economic and regulatory structures. While the evolution of the Eli 
debate resulted in a limited degree of French support for market opening, the 
momentum of a European negotiation became a radical spur for the 
liberalization of the German electricity sector. On the whole, the effect of 
overdrawn EU negotiations on the electricity directive was to considerably 
soften the initial divergence between French and German national interests, 
eventually changing the very nature of these interests.
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1. Various elements ot' this basic interpretation inform the literature on electricity 
liberalization. For example, the slow pace of the policy-making process has been explained in 
terms of a lack of convergence between national interests (see Stephen Padgett (1992). "The 
Single European Energy Market: The Politics of Realization". J o u r n a l  o f  C o m m o n  M a r k e t  
S tu d ie s . 30/1 (1992) pp. 53-75 and Francis McGowan: T h e S tr u g g le  f o r  P o w e r  in  E u r o p e :  
C o m p e ti t io n  a n d  R e g u la t io n  in th e  E C  e le c t r ic i t y  in d u s tr y  (London: Royal Institute ol 
International Affairs 1993). A more recent explanation consists in saying that a minimum 
intergovemmentalist consensus emerged on the need to liberalize electricity supply, both 
driven by technological change and bounded by resilient national interests, which lay the basis 
for a compromise on a pan-European electricity regime (see Janne H. Matlary . E n e r g y  P o l ic y  
in th e  E u r o p e a n  U n io n , (London: Macmillan Press 1997).
2. The contemporary IR literature typically describes clear-cut bargaining dynamics in which 
domestic and international bargaining "games" are simultaneously played by well-identified 
actors with relatively fixed preferences. For a generic example, see Robert Putnam. 
"Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games". I n te r n a tio n a l  
O r g a n iz a t io n .  42/3 (1988) pp. 427-460. For an application to the EU context, see Andrew 
Moravesik. T h e C h o ic e  f o r  E u r o p e :  S o c ia l  P u r p o s e  a n d  S ta te  P o w e r  f r o m  M e s s in a  to  
M a a s tr ic h t (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1998).
3. See Gary Marks, Fritz Scharpf, and Philippe Schmitter, G o v e r n a n c e  in  th e  E u ro p e a n  
U n io n  (London et al.: Sage 1996) and Adnenne Héritier. "The accommodation of diversity in 
European policy making and its outcomes: regulatory policy as a patchwork". J o u r n a l o f  
E u r o p e a n  P u b l ic  P o l ic y  3/2 (1996) pp. 149-167.
4. It is doubtful that market and technological trends alone would have jeopardized the 
predominance of nuclear energy in France and the German reliance on coal. In the United 
Kingdom, the “dash for gas" in electricity generation resulted from the privatization of the 
electricity supply industry -  not the reverse (see Rainer Eising, L ib e r a l is ie r u n g  a n d  
E u ro p c iis ie ru n g . D ie  r e g u la t iv e  R e fo rm  d e r  E le k tr i tz i tc i ts v e r s o r g u n g  in G r o f ib r i ta n n ie n , d e r  
E u r o p a is c h e n  G e m e in s c h a f t  a n d  d e r  B u n d e s r e p u b lik  D e u ts c h la n d  (Opladen: Leske + Budrich 
1999 (forthcoming)).
5. There is a huge body of scholarship on the topic of preferences and strategies, especially in 
the rational choice and game theory literature. As will become clear in the course of our 
argument, however, we mean something different than the rational pursuit of clear and 
objectively defined interests. Our understanding of p o l i t i c a l  strategy hinges on the existence 
of a "thick” social context, in which concerned actors are collectively participating in and at 
the same time constrained by a given policy agenda.
6. Institutionalist arguments cast in terms of institutional embeddedness are plentiful in the 
contemporary social science literature. For generic examples, see: Mark Granovetter, 
"Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness”. A m e r ic a n  J o u r n a l  
o f  S o c io lo g y  91/3 (1985) pp. 481-510; James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, R e d is c o v e r in g  

























































































































































































EUI Working Papers are published and distributed by the 
European University Institute, Florence
Copies can be obtained free of charge 
-  depending on the availability of stocks -  from:
The Publications Officer 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy



























































































Publications o f the European University Institute
To The Publications Officer
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) -  Italy 





□  Please send me a list of EUI Working Papers
□  Please send me a list of EUI book publications
□  Please send me the EUI brochure Academic Year 2000/01





































































































Working Papers of the
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
Published since 1999
RSC No. 99/1
Giorgia GIOVANNE l l  1 
EMU and the Mediterranean Area
RSC No. 99/2 
Carol HARLOW
Citizen Access to Political Power in the 
European Union
RSC No. 99/3 
Francesca BIGNAMI 
Accountability and Interest Group 
Participation in Comitology
RSC No. 99/4 
Mette Z0LNER 
Re-Imagining the Nation
RSC No. 99/5 
Walter MATTL1
Fora of International Commercial Dispute 
Resolution for Private Parties
RSC No. 99/6
Christoph U. SCHMID
Ways Out of the Maquis Communautaire -
On Simplification and Consolidation and the
Need for a Restatement of European Primary
Law
RSC No. 99/7 
Salvatore PITRUZZELLO 
Political Business Cycles and Independent 
Central Banks. German Governments and 
the Bundesbank (1960-1989)
RSC No. 99/8 
Veronika TACKE
Organisational Constructions of the BSE 
Problem. A Systems Theoretical Case Study 
on the Globalisation of Risk
RSC No. 99/9 
Robert SPRINGBORG 
Political Structural Adjustment in Egypt: A 
Precondition for Rapid Economic Growth?
RSC No. 99/10
Rebecca Jean EMIGH/Eva FODOR/lvdn 
SZELliNYI
The Racialization and Feminization of 
Poverty During the Market Transition in the 
Central and Southern Europe
RSC 99/11
John GOULD
Winners. Losers and the Institutional Effects 




A Partnership for Accession? The 
Implications of EU Conditionality for the 
Central and East European Applicants
RSC 99/13 
Tibor PAPP
Who is In, Who is Out? Citizenship, 
Nationhood. Democracy, and European 
Integration in the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia
RSC 99/14
Karin FIERKE/Antje WIENER 




The Political Economy of Restructuring of 
East-West Trade: Economic Winners and 
Losers in the CEECs and EU
RSC 99/16
Tanja A. BORZEL
Why there is No Southern Problem. On 




National Adaptation to European Integration:
The Importance of Institutional Veto Points





























































































The Differential Impact of Judicial Politics in 




The Power of EMU-Ideas: Reforming








Germany and the Enlargement of the 
European Union to the Czech Republic
RSC 99/22
Mark THATCHER
The Europeanisation of Regulation.
The Case of Telecommunications
RSC 99/23
Daniel C. THOMAS 
Boomerangs and Superpowers: The 




Labor Markets in the European Union
RSC 99/25
Grigorii V. GOLOSOV/Edward PONARIN 
Regional Bases of Party Politics: A Measure 
and Its Implicadons for the Study of Party 
System Consolidadon in New Democracies
RSC 99/26
Fritz BREUSS/Andrea WEBER 
Economic Policy Coordinauon in the EMU: 








Political Parties and Political Comtpdon in
Comparative Historical Perspective
RSC 99/29
Luis Manuel MACEDO PINTO DE SOUSA 
Corruption and Parties in Portugal
RSC 99/30
Jean CARTIER-BRESSON 
Corruption et partis politiques en France 
sous la Ve République: une première 
réflexion sur la relation entre les 
financements occultes et l'enrichissement
RSC 99/31
Giovanna ZINCONE
Citizenship: Between State and Society
RSC 99/32
Adrian FAVEL17Andrew GEDDES 
European Integration, Immigration and the 




Americanization and Its Limits: Reworking 




Interest Groups in a Multi-level Polity: The 
Impact of European Integration on National 
Systems
RSC 99/35 
David R. CAMERON 
Unemployment in the New Europe: The 
Contours of the Problem
RSC 2000/1
Gunnar TRUMBULL
Contested Ideas of the Consumer: National
Strategies of Product arket Regulation in
France and Germany
RSC 2000/2
Jacques MELITZ/Frdddric ZUMER 
Interregional and International Risk Sharing 
and Lessons for EMU
RSC 2000/3 
David D. LAITIN
Culture and National Identity: "The East" 
and European Integration

































































































US Civil-Society Assistance to the Arab 
World - The Cases of Egypt and Palestine
RSC 2000/6
Rainer EISING/Nicolas JABKO 
Moving Targets: Institutional Embeddedness 
and Domestic Politics in the Liberalization of 
EU Electricity Markets
* o u l o f  p rin t
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
